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A forer spouse's income tax lia-bilities can unexpectedly plague the
other spouse even years after a final
divorce, as most spouses are liable for
each other's taxes on income earned
during a marriage. The sources of such
liability are twofold. First, under Inter-
nal Revenue Code (O.R.C.) § 6013(d)(3),
if a couple files a joint return, each
spouse becomes jointly and severally
liable for the full amount of tax due
on the couple's combined earnings.
Because nearly all couples file jointly,
almost every ex-spouse is exposed to
liability for an audit adjustment to the
other ex-spouse's taxes, as long as the
statute of limitations remains open for
the joint return year.
In community property (CP) states,
each spouse is liable for federal in-
come taxes on one-half of the other's
CP income under the doctrine of Poe
v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Lia-
bility under Seaborn arises even when
the spouses file separate or no returns,
and it results automatically from resi-
dence in a CP jurisdiction.
Many experts believe that both
forms of liability are unjustified and
should be repealed. Recently, the ABA
Tax Section's Committee on Domestic
Relations fax Problems unanimously
recommended repeal, in the hope that
the ABA will officially adopt that po-
sition and persuade Congress to act.
In the meantime, we must live with
the law as it is.
Relief rules do exist for both forms
of liability for the "innocent spouse,"
discussed later, under certain limited
circumstances, but the rules are un-
certain and inadequate. It is conser-
vatively estimated that there are at least
10,000 instances a year that tax is col-
lected from the "wrong" spouse (gen-
erally the woman), despite the
innocent spouse rules, and many in-
volve substantial sums.
The income tax laws of many states
may also impose joint return liability
and/or CP tax liability. Many such
states provide innocent spouse relief
modeled on the federal rules, but the
relief rules may differ in detail. (Cali-
fornia, for example, has especially
generous relief rules.)
Most taxpayers even those ad-
vised by accountants or attorneys--
are completely unaware of having as-
sumed their spouses' tax liabilities. The
wife's attorney should inform her in
particular about all aspects of this. Al-
though both the joint return and CP
liability rules are gender-neutral, in
practice the vast majority of taxpayers
who are forced to pay their ex-spouses'
taxes are women. For simplicity, the
nonearning spouse will be referred to
here as the wife (W), and the earning
spouse as the husband (H), even
though occasionally it may be H who
must pay the tax on W's income.
joint return liability
More than 95 percent of married
couples elect to file jointly each year
to enjoy the tax savings that usually
result. Thus virtually all married per-
sons (even in CP states) are subject to
joint return liability. Even if W earned
nothing during the taxable year, and
all the tax liability resulted solely from
H's income, the IRS may, and often
does, attempt to collect the entire tax
from W, sometimes years after the
parties are separated or divorced. Fur-
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ther, W's liability is not limited to the
tax stated on the return. She is also
liable for subsequent assessments due
to H's unreported income or disal-
lowed deductions, and for interest and
penalties (except for the fraud pen-
alty, for which actual fraud must be
proved against her personally). I.R.C,
§ 6653(b)(3)). The IRS is under no ob-
ligation to pursue H first, and generally
chooses to collect from the spouse
from whom collection appears easier.
Also, W has no right to require the IRS,
or any tax forum, to join H as a party
in collection proceedings.
Innocent spouse rules
Under I.R.C. § 6013(e), W may ob-
tain relief from liability for tax on cer-
tain items attributable to H, despite
having made a joint return with H, if
she can qualify as an "innocent
spouse." The statutory requirements
for relief are: if (A) a joint return must
be made, W must prove (B) that there
is a "substantial understatement" on
the return, attributable to H's "grossly
erroneous items"; (C) that in signing
the return, W did not know, and had
no reason to know, that there was such
a substantial understatement; and (D)
that it would be inequitable under the
circumstances to hold W liable for the
deficiency attributable to such under-
statement. The burden of proof for
each of the above elements is on W.
Adams, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973).
A good defense
joint Election. The best defense is
that W did not file a joint return in the
first place, and that I.R.C. § 6013(d)
does not apply. Whether the election
was made is a question of W's intent.
Even if W did not sign the return, the
return may be joint if there is evidence
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of her acquiescence. Hanesworth v.
U.S., 936 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991). If
W signs under duress, the joint elec-
tion is not valid. Pirnia, 60 T.C.M. 554
(1990). If the couple is not legally mar-
ried, a joint return is invalid.
Grossly Erroneous Items. A grossly
erroneous tax item is either (A) in-
come that has been omitted from the
tax return, or (B) a claim of deduction,
credit, or basis for which there is "no
basis in fact or in law." !.R.C. §
6013(e)(2). Thus, no relief is available
if H simply fails to pay the tax that was
correctly reported on his return. Nor
is relief available for items other than
omitted income, and disallowed de-
ductions, credits, and claims of basis.
For example, there is no relief from
nonpayment of self-employment taxes.
Sivils, 86 T.C. 79 (1986).
Case law is confusing as to when
deductions have "no basis in fact or
law." It is clear that mere disallowance
is not enough to meet the test. Russo,
298 T.C. 28 (1992). The legislative his-
tory indicates that deductions that are
frivolous or phony do meet the test.
Anything in between mere disallow-
ance and frivolous or phony deduc-
tions is uncertain. For example,
authorities are divided as to whether
partially disallowed tax shelter deduc-
tions qualify. Ness, 95A F.2d 1495 (9th
Cir. 1992).
Dollar Limits. An understatement
due to omitted income is "substan-
tial" only if it exceeds $500 (net of
interest and penalties). I.R.C. §
6013(e)(3). Smaller amounts do not
qualify for relief. For erroneous claims
of deduction, credit, or basis, the dol-
lar limits are more strict. If W's ad-
justed gross income (AGI) for the year
immediately preceding assessment of
the deficiency is $20,000 or less, the
tax understatement must not only be
larger than $500, but the tax liability
attributable to the understatement
must also exceed 10 percent of her
AGI. If W's AGI for that year is more
than $20,000, the tax liability must ex-
ceed 25 percent of her AGI. Note also
that if W has remarried, her new hus-
band's income must be aggregated
with her own for purposes of deter-
mining "her" AGI; this is so even if W
and the new husband did not file a
joint return. I.R.C. § 601 3(e)(4)(D).
The only way W can defend against
collection proceedings brought by the
IRS on the ground of joint return lia-
bility is through the innocent spouse
rules. For the limited effectiveness of
a tax indemnification agreement be-
tween H and W, see page 33.
Innocence
The burden of proof is on W to es-
tablish that she had no reason to know
of the grossly erroneous item(s). This
"innocence" requirement is the most
difficult to prove, and the most fre-
quently litigated issue. If W is aware
of facts that ought to put a reasonable
person with her education and expe-
rience on notice that H may have
omitted income or overstated deduc-
tions, W has a duty to look into such
facts before signing the return. For ex-
ample, awareness of large or unusual
expenditures has been held to put W
on notice about unreported income.
Also, W's involvement in H's business
affairs or in the family finances may be
deemed to put her on notice, if H's
tax delinquency was reasonably in-
ferred from such involvement. W's
higher education, especially in busi-
ness or accounting, and/or her inde-
pendent business experience, has
sometimes been held against her, on
the ground that such experience ought
to give her greater awareness of her
tax responsibilities.
It has been held that large tax losses
on the return without any correspond-
ing reduction in standard of living
should put W on notice. But the courts
have been inconsistent as to whether
W has a duty to review the tax return
in the first place. Compare Shapiro, 51
T.C.M. 818 (1986), with Hinds, 56
T.C.M. 104 (1988). How much inquiry
into such items is reasonable has also
been decided inconsistently. Com-
pare Cohen, 54 T.C.M. 944 (1987), with
Price v. U.S., 887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir.
1989). A similar uncertainty clouds the
question whether W's good faith re-
liance on professional tax advice is
enough to exonerate W.
If H refuses to discuss his tax or fi-
nancial affairs with W, that does not
in itself put W on notice, at least if the
refusal is a long-standing pattern of the
marriage. Estate of Weissbart, 63 T.C.M.
1845 (1992). An often-successful de-
fense has held that H systematically
kept W in the dark as to his finances,
especially where W was dependent
and financially unsophisticated.
McCoy doctrine
A line of cases has held that where
W is aware of the existence of the un-
derlying transaction, her ignorance of
the tax consequences does not con-
stitute innocence. Where both W and
H were ignorant of the tax conse-
quences, relief has been denied on the
questionable ground that W was not
misled by H. McCoy, 57 T.C. 732
(1972). On the other hand, in all cases
involving omitted income, W was still
living with H at the time of trial, which
may have been the unexplained
ground of decision. The "ignorance of
the law is no excuse" theory of McCoy
has been ignored in many decisions
granting relief when W was widowed
or divorced. See, e.g., Ratana, 662 F.2d
220 (4th Cir. 1981).
Taken literally, the McCoy doctrine
would preclude relief for all disal-
lowed deductions, because W is nec-
essarily aware of the existence of the
item deducted on the return. The Tax
Court has rendered this strict interpre-
tation, but in a case where W was still
married. Bokum, 94 T.C. 126 (1990).
Appeals courts have been more flex-
ible in granting relief, and have held
that bare knowledge of the item's ex-
istence is not enough to preclude re-
lief. W must be aware of at least some
questionable circumstances as well.
Erdahl, 930 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1991).
Equity
The question whether it would be
"inequitable" under the circum-
stances to hold W liable translates in
practice to whether W can demon-
strate that she did not receive any sig-
nificant economic benefit from the
unpaid taxes over and above ordinary
support. Both lifestyle during marriage
and property settlements at termina-
tion are relevant to the benefit test.
The courts have occasionally been le-
nient in finding that substantial prop-
erty settlements do not exceed
ordinary support, especially in cases
where W has children to support. Ter-
zian, 72 T.C. 1164 (1979). As with the
innocence issue, these cases are largely
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irreconcilable in terms of the rules.
They turn upon their facts.
Sympathy
The sympathy test is not in the stat-
ute, but it is perhaps the most impor-
tant factor of all. H's mistreatment or
abandonment of W is usually men-
tioned in her favor in reported deci-
sions. Women who were homemakers
and mothers have received more sym-
pathy in the Tax Court than have well-
educated or independent women.
And, of course, it helps if W is poor
and has children to support. Con-
versely, it appears all but impossible
for W to obtain relief if she is still living
with H at the time of trial. Treasury
Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) permits the court
to take into consideration whether W
was deserted or is separated from H;
but the Tax Court sometimes seems
to consider separation or pending di-
vorce a necessary element for relief.
Hunt, 62 T.C.M. 1238 (1991).
Reduce future exposure
Married couples are eligible to file
a joint federal tax return if they are still
married on the last day of the taxable
year, whether or not they are sepa-
rated, and even if they are already di-
vorced at the time of filing. During
settlement negotiations, H will often
suggest that a provision be included
in the separation agreement requiring
the parties to file a joint return for the
current or future years to achieve a tax
saving. Counsel for W should exercise
great caution before agreeing to such
a request. The tax saving is usually
modest and benefits H more than W
because H is on average the higher
earner. But the risk from joint return
liability is borne primarily by W, and
may involve sums far in excess of the
tax saving. Even if the spouses nego-
tiate to share the saving equally, W's
portion often isn't worth the substan-
tial risk. There is no obligation to agree
to such a request. A divorce court can-
not force W to sign a joint return, be-
cause joint filing is a voluntary election.
Leftwich v. Leftwich, 442 A.2d 139 (D.C
Ct. App. 1980).
Counsel should be especially wary
of allowing W to sign joint returns for
prior tax years that are already delin-
quent. When there is any risk that H
will not pay the overdue taxes, coun-
sel may be exposed to actionable mal-
practice. Newberry v. Johnson, 294 Ark.
455, 743 S.W.2d 811 (1988). Filing
separately avoids joint return liability
altogether.
Protect your client
A properly drafted separation agree-
ment should specify which spouse is
obligated to pay contingent tax liabil-
ities arising from joint returns for past
years, as well as for the current year.
But counsel should not be overly con-
fident about the protection afforded
by such an indemnity clause: It is not
binding on the IRS, but the IRS may
pursue W notwithstanding the agree-
ment. Buchine, 63 T.C.M. 1838 (1992).
An agreement will facilitate W's action
for indemnity against H in the event
that she is forced to pay the joint taxes.
But even without an indemnity clause,
all states provide W with an equiva-
lent right of action for contribution un-
der common law, and most states also
by statute, if she is forced to overpay
her share of the joint obligation. Bor-
master v. Bormaster, 177 Kan. 1, 274
P.2d 757 (1954). Enforcing a tax in-
demnity provision may be impractical,
however, because of the litigation ex-
pense or because H is unable to pay
the judgment. Case reports for suits
for contribution are exceedingly rare.
Even if W is eventually successful in
her suit for contribution (or indem-
nity), having to pay the tax first may
be onerous. If her claim for reimburse-
ment is uncollectible, she is not enti-
tled to a bad-debt deduction, even if
she is a judgment creditor. Rude, 48
T.C. 165 (1967).
Mitigate exposure
The financial disclosure process of
the divorce action offers you a chance
to assess tax risks. If H is not cooper-
ative, or appears deceptive about his
financial affairs, he has likely been
evasive in tax matters as well. Counsel
should exercise special care if H is self-
employed or manages a small busi-
ness, particularly one in which trans-
actions are primarily in cash, as such
businesses allow significant opportu-
nity for tax avoidance or evasion.
Examine prior joint returns for warn-
ing signs of tax problems. Pay special
attention to large partnership deduc-
tions and to any apparent discrepan-
cies between prior reported income
and the family's standard of living. If
these signs appear, W should consider
laying the groundwork for a future in-
nocent spouse claim. For example, any
tax indemnity clause contained in the
settlement agreement might recite that
W had no knowledge of, or involve-
ment in, H's business or tax matters
for as many tax years as you can pos-
sibly include. (Remember that the
statute of limitations never expires for
tax fraud.) Similarly, if W's knowledge
of and participation in family financial
affairs was limited, it would be wise to
recite this in the agreement.
Such assertions are more persuasive
if they are documented before any au-
dit or assessment. Recitations in the
signed agreement also help preclude
H from testifying to the contrary in any
future innocent spouse litigation.
Document the source of any property
transferred from H to W, and avoid
accepting any property that might
have been derived from H's unreport-
ed income or from refunds from tax
shelter losses.
If H has outstanding unpaid tax lia-
bilities from joint returns, W's counsel
should insist that they be paid or that
W be given appropriate security to
protect her in the event that she be-
comes obligated to pay the IRS.
Finally, make sure that W sends to
the IRS a notice of H's change of ad-
dress as soon as he leaves the marital
residence. This will ensure that any fu-
ture deficiency notice will be sent to
H, as well as to W, and may help direct
IRS collection efforts toward H. If H
has moved to a different IRS district,
however (there are 64 in the United
States), the IRS collection agent is still
likely to proceed against W if she ap-
pears able to pay, rather than transfer
the case to another district.
Note that under a recent IRS policy
change, collection personnel may (but
are not required to) pursue H first and
defer collection from W, if W makes
an innocent spouse claim and re-
quests relief.
CP liability
Under Poe v. Seaborn, supra, a tax-
payer who resides in a CP jurisdiction
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is liable for one-half of a spouse's in-
come taxes incurred by earnings that
are treated as CP under applicable state
family-property law. Seaborn con-
strued family property law in the CP
states as creating this liability, on the
theory that CP earnings during mar-
riage are owned by and taxable to each
spouse in equal amounts. This form of
liability does not depend on filing a
joint return. It results automatically
from residence in a CP jurisdiction,
unless the couple elected not to live
under community property rules.
W's best defense is that the item of
H's income in question is not CP in-
come at all. Federal taxation of CP in-
come depends on state law, and state
rules vary greatly as to which items
qualify as CP while the community re-
mains in effect. (Income from separate
property, for example, is separate
property in some states, but it is CP in
others.) State law also varies signifi-
cantly as to how and when the com-
munity may be severed by separation
of the spouses or by agreement. If H's
income was earned after the com-
munity was severed, liability under
Seaborn does not apply.
Current CP states include Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
Relief under I.R.C. § 66
The innocent spouse provisions for
relief from CP liability under I.R.C. §
66 are analogous in many respects to
relief under I.R.C. § 601 3(e). The rules
are more restrictive, however, and they
have often failed to prevent obviously
unfair results. The reported case law
shows that nearly all petitioners for re-
lief under I.R.C. § 66 have lost. When
I R.C. § 66 was enacted, its revenue
cost was estimated to be "negligible";
the prediction has proved accurate.
I.R.C. § 66(c) is similar to I.R.C. §
6013(e) and contains the same re-
quirements of "innocence" and "eq-
uity" discussed earlier. There are no
dollar limits, however, and the provi-
sion applies only to unreported in-
come. The innocence test is nearly
impossible to meet, because if W
knows H was employed, she loses,
even though she may have no knowl-
edge of the amount of his earnings.
Dooley, 63 T.C.M. 1858 (1992).
Two other provisions allow relief
without proof of innocence, but they
suffer other shortcomings. None of the
I.R.C. § 66 provisions provide any re-
lief for items other than omissions of
income. Nor is relief available for taxes
on CP investment income under I.R.C.
§ 66(a) and (b).
I.R.C. § 66(a) provides relief only if
the couple lived apart during the cal-
endar year, and none of the earned
income in question was transferred
between them. Even one day of co-
habitation during the year, or any pay-
ments (other than child support) that
are not minimal, will preclude relief.
I.R.C. § 66(b) provides that CP-law
benefits may be disallowed to any tax-
payer who acts as if he alone is enti-
tled to the community income and fails
to notify his spouse of the nature and
amount of such income before the due
date for the taxable year. The "bene-
fit" in this situation is H's relief of tax
liability for one-half of his earnings. This
provision may be defeated if H noti-
fies W of her liability, even if he trans-
fers nothing to her.
The Seaborn doctrine does not ap-
ply to payroll taxes, which in principle
must be withheld in full. Although one-
half of H's wage withholding for fed-
eral income taxes is automatically
credited against W's tax liability, if H
deliberately underwithholds (or if
withholding is not required, as for div-
idends, interest, and capital gains), H
can in effect deliberately transfer lia-
bility for one-half of the resulting de-
ficiency to W.
Indemnity
Where state law permits severance
of the community by voluntary action
or agreement, take the necessary steps
for severance as soon as possible.
Agreements to end the community are
respected for federal tax purposes if
valid under state law. Ending the com-
munity thus stops the clock on any
further tax liability. Schoenhair, 45
B.T.A. 576 (1941) (Arizona).
A tax indemnity clause in the prop-
erty settlement agreement would be
useful, because (unlike under joint re-
turn liability) if W is forced to pay H's
taxes under Seaborn, she otherwise has
no right to reimbursement from H un-
der state law. It is perhaps desirable as
well to include recitations to lay the
foundation for a future claim of inno-
cence under I.R.C. § 66(c), but, as
noted earlier in this article, little reli-
ance can realistically be placed on such
a claim. N
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